Descartes and the Cogito

In the Cogito ergo sum all is lost, since consciousness of being is subordinated to the experience of thought; when being is thus blurred it carries thought downwards with it, for if it is necessary to prove being, it is necess ary also to prove the effi cacy of the intelligence, hence the validity of its conclusions, the soundness of the ergo. Guénon, who had the great merit of restoring to the conceptions of intellectuality and of orthodoxy their true and universal meaning, once wrote to us on the subject of the Cogito: "In order to see all that is involved in Descartes' saying `I think, therefore I am,' it is necessary to consider the twofold reduction which this effects: firstly, the `I' is reduced to the soul alone (the body being excluded); and secondly, the soul itself is reduced to thought, `a substance the whole nature of which consists solely of thinking'; the distinction which he maintains between substances and their respective principal attributes seems to be primarily verbal since for him the principal attribute expresses completely the essence or the nature of the substance. There has been much discussion on the question of knowing whether the Cartesian formula ought really to be considered as an argument or line of reasoning; the ergo however does not seem open to any interpretation other than as signifying a deduction. The same objection can also be applied to the famous `ontological argument'; everything that it contains which is true and metaphysically valid comes down to the affirmation `Being is,' where there is no trace of argument. In this connection one could recall the absurd philosophical question of the `criterion of truth,' that is to say the search for an external sign by which truth would infallibly be recognized; this question is among those that cannot be solved becaus e they do not really arise."

If Plato maintains that the philosophos should think independently of common opinions, he refers to intellection and not to logic alone; whereas a Descartes, who did everything to restrict and compromise the notion of philosophy, means it while starting from systematic doubt, so much so that for him philosophy is synonymous not only with rationalism, but also with skepticism. This is a first suicide of the intelligence, inaugurated moreover by Pyrrho and others, by way of a reaction against what was believed to be metaphysical “dogmatism.” The “Greek miracle” is in fact the substitution of the reason for the Intellect, of the fact for the Principle, of the phenomenon for the Idea, of the accident for the Substance, of the form for the Essence, of man for God; and this applies to art as well as to thought. The true Greek miracle, if miracle there be — and in this case it would be related to the “Hindu miracle” — is doctrinal metaphysics and methodic logic, providentially utilized by the monotheistic Semites.

Rationalism is the thought of the Cartesian "therefore," which signals a proof; this has nothing to do with the "therefore" that language demands when we intend to express a logico-ontological relationship. Instead of cogito ergo sum, one ought to say: sum quia est esse, "I am because Being is"; "because" and not "therefore." The certitude that we exist would be impossible without absolute, hence necessary, Being, which inspires both our existence and our certitude; Being and Consciousness: these are the two roots of our reality. Vedanta adds Beatitude, which is the ultimate content of both Consciousness and Being.

The truth of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum is, not that it presents thought as the proof of Being, but simply that it enunciates the primacy of thought — hence of consciousness or of intelligence — in relation to the material world which surrounds us; certainly, it is not our personal thought which preceded the world, but it was—or is—absolute Consciousness, of which our thought is precisely a distant reflection; our thought which reminds us — and proves to us — that in the beginning was the Spirit. Nothing is more absurd than to have intelligence derive from matter, hence the greater from the lesser; the evolutionary leap from matter to intelligence is from every point of view the most inconceivable thing that could be.

What good, for example, is Schelling's correct view of intellectual contemplation and of the transcending of the subject-object relationship in the Absolute, since it is accompanied by the promise of a flat philosophical pseudo-religion mingled with a classical or academic aestheticism of the most banal style? The replacing of the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum by the formula of Maine de Biran: "I act, I will, I exist," or the Sum cogitans of Heidegger, and so on, is strictly a matter of taste, or of mental illusion; the starting point in all cases of this kind is at bottom merely an ignorance ignorant of itsel f. It may well be asked why thought or action are any better proof of our existence than some sensation or other; it is precisely the intelligence which shows us that many things exist without thinking, acting or willing, for once we see that stones exist, we have no need to invoke thought or action as proofs of our own existence, provided, of course, we admit that we are certain of the objective value of our vision. Now we are certain of it by virtue of the infallibility of the Intellect, and that is a subject which admits of no discussion, any more than does the question of knowing whether we are sane or mad. Philosophers readily found their systems on the absence of this certitude, which is however the conditio sine qua non of all knowledge, and even of all thought and all action.

Cartesianism — perhaps the most intelligent way of being unintelligent — is the classic example of a faith which has become the dupe of the gropings of reasoning; this is a "wisdom from below" and history shows it to be deadly. The whole of modern philosophy, including science, starts from a false conception of intelligence; for instance, the modern cult of "life" sins in the sense that it seeks the explanation and goal of man at a level below him, in something which could not serve to define the human creature. But in a much more general way, all rationalism — whether direct or indirect — is false from the sole fact that it limits the intelligence to reason or intellection to logic, or in other words cause to effect.

The Cartesian cogito ergo sum stops halfway; it would be necessary to add: "I am, therefore I am That which is," or even: "Being is, therefore I am"; the word "therefore" indicating here, not a conclusion, but a relationship of intellectually "visible" causality.

... the "intellectual worldliness" inaugurated by the Renaissance and by Descartes resulted in a weakening of contemplative intelligence and religious instinct...

A word concerning metaphysical certitude, or the infallibility of pure intellection, is perhaps called for here. "I think, therefore I am," said Descartes; aside from the fact that our existence is not proven by thought alone, he should have added: "I am, therefore Being is"; or he could have said in the first place: "I think because I am." In any event, the foundation of metaphysical certitude is the coincidence between truth and our being; a coincidence that no ratiocination could invalidate. Contingent things are proven by factors situated within their order of contingency, whereas things deriving from the Absolute become clear by their participation in the Absolute, hence by a "superabundance of light" — according to Saint Thomas — which amounts to saying that they are proven by themselves. In other words, universal truths draw their evidence not from our contingent thought, but from our transpersonal being, which constitutes the substance of our spirit and guarantees the adequacy of intellection.

The Absolute and the Infinite are complementary, the first being exclusive and the second inclusive: the Absolute excludes everything that is contingent; the Infinite includes everything that is. Within contingency, the Absolute gives rise to perfection and the Infinite to indefiniteness: the sphere is perfect, space is indefinite. Descartes reserved the term “infinite” for God alone, whereas Pascal speaks of several infinites; one must agree with Descartes yet without taking Pascal to task, for the absolute meaning of the word does not result from its literal meaning; images are physical before they are metaphysical, even though the causal relationship is the converse. Theology teaches that God is infinitely good and infinitely just since He is infinite; but, this would be a contradiction if one were too fastidious, for an infinite quality in the absolute sense would exclude any other quality.

... scepticism does not always need the help of Cartesian philosophy to implant itself, for the latter would be sterile without a soil ready to receive it; in fact, all "worldliness" is a breach through which, given favorable conditions, the spirit of doubt and of denial of the supernatural is made welcome.

100 Skepticism

Descartes opined: in the beginning was doubt --
In other words: in the beginning was the devil,
Namely error. For certainty
Is what overcomes the cunning of doubt.

Intellectual intuition, not the play of thought,
Is the key to Knowledge; man has indulged
Much too much in the pseudo-thinking of doubt.
Truth stands in the heart -- it is written in God.

CXVII

The word "philosopher" has two meanings:
Firstly, the meaning that it had before Descartes;
And then the absurdity of the moderns:
A thinking that operates only with reason.

If one wishes to measure with true measures,
One should not forget what is said here.
A philosopher is any man who thinks,
Including the sage who never violates the Truth.