The notion of philosophy
The notion of philosophy, with its suggestion of human fallibility, evokes ipso facto the problem of infallibility, and thereby the question of knowing whether man is condemned by his nature to be mistaken. We have seen in the course of this book that in fact the human mind, even when disciplined by a sacred tradition, remains exposed to many faults. That these should be possible does not mean that they are inevitable in principle; on the contrary they are due to causes that are not at all mysterious. Doctrinal infallibility pertains to the realm of orthodoxy and authority, the first element being objective and the second subjective, each having a bearing that is either formal or formless, extrinsic or intrinsic, traditional or universal, depending on the case.
This being so, it is not even difficult to be infallible when one knows one’s limits; it is enough not to speak of things of which one is ignorant, which presupposes that one knows that one is ignorant of them. This amounts to saying that infallibility is not only a matter of information and intellection, but that it also, and essentially, comprises a moral or a psychological condition, in the absence of which even men who are in principle infallible become accidentally fallible. Let us add that it is not blameworthy to offer a plausible hypothesis, on condition that is not be presented in the form of certitude ex cathedra.
At all events, no infallibility exists which a priori encompasses all possible contingent domains; omniscience is not a human possibility. No one can be infallible with regard to unknown, or insufficiently known, phenomena; one may have an intuition for pure principles without having one for a given phenomenal order, that is to say, without being able to apply the principles spontaneously in such and such a domain. The importance of this possible incapacity diminishes to the extent that the phenomenal domain envisaged is secondary and, on the contrary, that the principles infallibly enunciated are essential. One must forgive small errors on the part of one who offers great truths — and it is the latter that determine how small or how great the errors are — whereas it would obviously be perverse to forgive great errors when they are accompanied by many small truths.(1)
Infallibility, in a sense by definition, pertains in one degree or another to the Holy Spirit, in a way that may be extraordinary or ordinary, properly supernatural or quasi-natural; now the Holy Spirit, in the religious order, adapts itself to the nature of man in the sense that it limits itself to preventing the victory of intrinsic heresies, a victory which would falsify this “divine form” that is the religion; for the upaya, the “saving mirage,” is willed by Heaven, not by men.(2)
1. There is certainly no reason to admire a science which counts insects and atoms but is ignorant of God; which makes an avowal of not knowing Him and yet claims omniscience by principle. It should be noted that the scientist, like every other rationalist, does not base himself on reason in itself; he calls “ reason” his lack of imagination and knowledge, and his ignorances are for him the “ data” of reason. 2 . Always respect ful of this form, the Holy Spirit will not teach a Moslem theologian the subtleties of trinitarian theology nor those of Vedanta; from another angle, it will not change a raci al or ethnic mentality; neither that of the Romans in view of Catholicism, nor that of the Arabs in view of Islam. Humanity must not only have its history, but also its stories.