What is the intellect and Intellection?

... intellection, on the one hand it necessarily expresses itself by means of reason and on the other hand it can make use of the latter as a support for actualization. These two factors enable theologians to reduce intellection to reasoning; that is to say, they deny it — while at the same time seeing in rationality an element that is more or less problematic if not contrary to faith — without seeking or being able to account for the fact that faith is itself an indirect, and in a way, anticipated mode of intellection.

The intellect is a receptive faculty and not a productive power: it does not "create," it receives and transmits; it is a mirror reflecting reality in a manner that is adequate and therefore effective. In most men of the "iron age" the intellect is atrophied to the point of being reduced to a mere virtuality, although doubtless there is no watertight partition between it and the reason, for a sound process of reasoning indirectly transmits something of the intellect; be that as it may, the respective operations of the reason – or the mind – and of the intellect are fundamentally different from the point of view that interests us here, despite certain appearances due to the fact that every man is a thinking being, whether he be wise or ignorant.

There is at the same time analogy and opposition: the mind is analogous to the intellect insofar as it is a kind of intelligence, but is opposed to it by its limited, indirect and discursive character; as for the apparent limitations of the intellect, they are merely accidental and extrinsic, while the limits of the mental faculty are inherent in it. Even if the intellect cannot exteriorize the "total truth" – or rather reality – because that is in itself impossible, it can perfectly well establish points of reference which are adequate and sufficient, rather as it is possible to represent space by a circle, a cross, a square, a spiral or a point and so on. Truth and reality must not be confused: the latter relates to "being" and signifies the aseity of things, and the former relates to "knowing" – to the image of reality reflected in the mirror of the intellect – and signifies the adequation of "being" and "knowing"; it is true that reality is often designated by the word "truth," but this is a dialectical synthesis which aims at defining truth in relation to its virtuality of "being," of "reality."

If truth is thus made to embrace ontological reality, aseity, the inexpressible, and so also the "personal" realization of the Divine, there is clearly no "total truth" on the plane of thought; but if by "truth" is understood thought insofar as it is an adequate reflection, on the intellectual plane, of "being," there is a "total truth" on this plane, but on condition firstly that nothing quantitative is envisaged in this totality, and secondly that it is made clear that this totality can have a relative sense, according to the order of thought to which it belongs.

There is a total truth which is such because it embraces, in principle, all possible truths: this is metaphysical doctrine, whether its enunciation be simple or complex, symbolical or dialectical; but there is also a truth which is total on the plane of spiritual realization, and in this case "truth" becomes synonymous with "reality." Since on the plane of facts there is never anything absolute – or more precisely, nothing "absolutely absolute" – the "totality," while being perfect and sufficient in practice, is always relative in theory; it is indefinitely extensible, but also indefinitely reducible; it can assume the form of an extended doctrine, but also that of a simple sentence, just as the totality of space can be expressed by a system of intertwining patterns too complex for the eye to unravel, but also by an elementary geometrical figure.

 

We have compared pure intelligence to a mirror; now it must be recalled that there is always a certain element of inversion in the relationship between subject and object, that is, the subject which reflects inverts the object reflected. A tree reflected in water is inverted, and so is "false" in relation to the real tree, but it is still a tree – even "this" tree – and never anything else: consequently the reflected tree is perfectly "true," despite its illusory character, so that it is a mistake to conclude that intellection is illusory because of its subjective framework. The powers of the cosmic illusion are not unlimited, for the Absolute is reflected in the contingent, otherwise the latter would not exist; everything is in God – "All is Atma" – and the Absolute flashes forth everywhere, it is "infinitely close"; barriers are illusory, they are at the same time immeasurably great and infinitesimally small.

The world is antinomic by definition, which is a way of saying it is not God; every image is at the same time true and false, and it suffices to discern the various relationships. Christ is "true God and true man," which is the very formula of the antinomy and parallelism governing the cosmos: antinomy because the creature is not the Creator, and parallelism because nothing can be "outside God," Reality being one. In a certain sense, doctrine is identical with truth, for account must always be taken of the "relatively absolute"; doctrine should have more than a relative value for us seeing that its content transcends relativities to the extent that it is essential.

There is no difficulty in the fact that pure intelligence – the intellect – immensely surpasses thought, and that there is no continuity – despite the identity of essence – between a concept as such and reality, the aseity of the real; to lament over the shortcomings of thought is to ask it to be something that it is not; this is the classical error of philosophers who seek to enclose everything in the cogito alone. From the point of view of concrete – not abstract – knowledge of the transcendent, the problem of thought is resolved in the very nature of the intellect. There are objects which exceed the possibilities of reason; there are none which exceed those of intelligence as such. If there were not something absolute in man – he is "made in the image of God" – he would be only an animal like other animals; but man knows the animals, while they do not know man. Man alone can step out of the cosmos, and this possibility proves – and presupposes – that in a certain way he incarnates the Absolute.(7)